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KATANGA: THE CONGO’S FORGOTTEN CRISIS 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Katanga province is one of the most violent yet neglected 
regions of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Most 
of its problems are the same as those that are systemic in 
the rest of the country but it needs urgent attention 
because it is both the heartland of national politics and the 
nation’s most mineral-rich province, a potential economic 
dynamo whose mines once produced 50 per cent to 80 
per cent of the national budget. If the March 2006 
elections are to be peaceful and have a chance to produce 
a stable, legitimate government, both foreign and 
domestic actors need to pay particular heed to the key 
province while doing more and doing it immediately to 
integrate the army, eliminate parallel chains of command 
and eradicate corruption. Waiting for the elections to put a 
new government in place before moving on those issues, 
as present international strategy implies, has it the wrong 
way around.  
The home province of President Joseph Kabila and many 
other senior Kinshasa politicians is divided by three 
conflicts: tensions between southerners and northerners, 
between outsiders and natives, and between Mai-Mai 
militias and the national army.  
The north-south competition has become pronounced 
since Laurent Kabila, a northerner and father of the 
current president, Joseph Kabila, seized power by 
overthrowing the Mobutu dictatorship in 1997. The south 
is one of the most mineral-rich areas of the continent, 
whose copper and cobalt deposits have prompted 
Katangan politicians – mainly northerners – to cultivate 
personal networks in the local security forces to protect 
their interests and threaten their rivals. These officials are 
resented by southerners, who feel excluded from the 
wealth of the province. This rivalry has triggered 
violence. In October 2004, for example, the army killed 
over 70 civilians while suppressing a rebellion by a 
ramshackle militia in the mining town of Kilwa. In May 
2005, officials alleged a secession plot in Lubumbashi 
and arrested south Katangan politicians and military 
officers. Both operations appear to have been prompted 
by Kinshasa politicians eager to protect their mining 
interests and to squash opposition.  
The election campaign has reignited conflict between 
native Katangans and immigrants from Kasai province. 
Under Belgian rule, many Luba from Kasai came to run 
the mining companies and state administration, creating 
tensions manipulated by politicians, who in 1992-1993 
organised militias to ethnically cleanse the province. 
More than 5,000 Luba were killed. The Union of 
Congolese Nationalists and Federalists party (UNAFEC), 
which is run by some of the same figures who led the 
violence in the early 1990s, is using its youth gangs to 
intimidate its opposition, who are often Luba. Leaders of 
the party’s youth wing have called for “necklacing” 
opponents with burning tyres. 
The violence in the remote areas of northern Katanga 
is tightly linked to actors in Kinshasa. During the war, 
Laurent Kabila created Mai-Mai militias in the region 
to stem the advance of Rwandan-backed rebels. These 
militias, bolstered by arms from officials in Kinshasa 
as recently as 2004, have not been integrated into the 
national army and are fighting each other and the 
army over poaching and taxation rights.  
It is past time to address these problems. The government 
has primary responsibility for security in the province. It 
must take steps to integrate the Mai-Mai militias into the 
national army and arrest commanders guilty of war 
crimes. After exhausting all peaceful means, it should 
deploy integrated army brigades to Katanga to dismantle 
recalcitrant armed groups. The UN mission (MONUC) 
should play an important role in these operations. It has 
been efficient in dealing with similar militia in the Ituri 
district, where 14,000 combatants have been demobilised, 
and the Katanga militias are not as well armed or 
organised. However, the minimal reinforcement – an 800-
strong battalion – authorised in late 2005 by the Security 
Council for the province is insufficient. The 2,590-strong 
brigade asked for by the Secretary-General is needed. 
In Katanga, as elsewhere in the country, bad governance 
and impunity are closely linked to violence. Officials use 
parallel chains of command in the army and 
administration to protect their interests and embezzle state 
funds. The justice sector is too weak and politicised to 
curb these excesses. Current levels of corruption and 
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abuse of power are themselves sources of instability that 
threaten the transition and could compromise elections, 
while discontented politicians are likely to take advantage 
of the weak state to stir up trouble and contest election 
results. Donors should take a firmer stance now on 
corruption and impunity. Their aid – over half the present 
national budget – gives leverage to impose stricter 
supervision of funds, like what is being attempted in 
Liberia. They should also give more support to Congolese 
institutions charged with good governance that are trying 
to curb corruption, such as courts and parliamentary 
commissions.  
RECOMMENDATIONS  
To the Transitional Government of the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo:  
1. Arrest the military commanders in the Mai-Mai 
and other armed Katangan groups who are 
suspected of human rights abuses, paying special 
attention to those believed responsible for the 
events in Ankoro in 2002, Kilwa in October 2004, 
and the ongoing unrest in the Mitwaba-Pweto-
Manono-Dubie area. 
2. Deploy integrated national army (FARDC) units 
with MONUC to northern and central Katanga 
to pressure militias to integrate into the army or 
demobilise. 
3. Comply with the Global and Inclusive Agreement 
for the complete integration of the security 
services, the administration, and the judicial 
system in Katanga so that all components of the 
transitional government are represented in these 
bodies. 
4. Discuss openly in parliament the Lutundula 
Commission report on contracts, including mining 
deals, that were signed during the war and publish 
a list of the major wrongdoers.  
5. Take the following measures to prevent corruption 
in the mining sector:  
(a) Bar sweetheart deals such as concessions 
or special tax exemptions on mineral 
exports awarded to individual companies 
by government officials in exchange for 
commissions or other benefits.  
(b) Give the National Customs Office (OFIDA) 
the means to test minerals and pay and train 
its agents adequately.  
6. Pass laws on campaign finance and the financing 
of political parties in order to increase the prospect 
of free and fair elections in March 2006, and 
include provisions in the electoral law to outlaw 
and punish hate speech, especially hate speech 
directed toward ethnic groups.  
7. Reaffirm that the National Demobilisation and 
Reintegration Commission (CONADER) has 
responsibility for demobilising armed groups in 
Katanga and prevent other groups, such as the 
Church Program for Peace and Conflict 
Transformation and Reconciliation (PAREC), 
from undertaking competing programs.  
To the UN Security Council, the Secretary-General 
and MONUC: 
8. Raise MONUC’s troop ceiling by 2,590, as 
requested by the Secretrary-General in order to 
deploy a full brigade of peacekeepers to northern 
Katanga and equip this brigade with a clear 
concept of operations that authorises robust 
cordon and search and demilitarisation operations 
like those used in Ituri. 
9. Instruct MONUC to carry out its mandate to 
monitor the arms embargo, especially at the 
Lubumbashi and Kalemie airports.  
10. Support formation of a donors group focused on 
corruption and mismanagement and that ties 
assistance to political and administrative reforms 
such as suggested by the Secretary-General. 
To the European Union and its Member States, 
the U.S. and Other Donors and Members of the 
International Committee for Support of the 
Transition (CIAT), the World Bank, and the IMF: 
11. Tie donor aid to political and administrative 
reforms and create a focus group of key donor 
countries as well as the World Bank and the 
IMF to look into corruption and mismanagement 
together with Congolese institutions in charge of 
good governance, and in Katanga to look in 
particular at: 
(a) corruption in OFIDA, the mining sector 
and the parastatals, including Societé 
nationale des chemins de fer du Congo 
(SNCC) and Gécamines; 
(b) establishment of an effective control 
mechanism for the testing and export of 
minerals; and 
(c) ending parallel command structures and 
integrating administrative, judicial and 
military services. 
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12. Support reform and upgrading of OFIDA, 
including with laboratory facilities to test mineral 
exports. 
13. Take actions to ensure that international companies 
active in the Congo respect domestic laws and 
international norms, including imposing as necessary 
penalties on national companies that are in violation. 
To International Mining Companies and Traders 
and the International Labour Organisation: 
14. Agree on a code of good conduct respectful of 
employee working conditions and living standards 
and in compliance with Congolese laws and 
international norms.  
15. Set up in cooperation with local human rights 
associations a trust fund supporting fair payment, 
relocation, land rights, medical care and training 
for artisanal miners. 
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KATANGA: THE CONGO’S FORGOTTEN CRISIS 
I. INTRODUCTION1 
Katanga province has a long history of unrest. During 
colonial rule, its copper, cobalt and uranium mines were 
the state’s richest revenue source. Administered by a 
Special Committee of Katanga until 1910, it was only 
fully integrated into the Belgian colonial state in 1933. 
Upon independence in 1960, Patrice Lumumba was 
elected prime minister and set about creating a strong 
central government, a move that was resented by 
Katangan leaders. Weeks after independence, Moise 
Tshombe’s National Confederation of Katanga 
(CONAKAT), supported by Belgian and American 
interests, declared a secession that led to a falling out 
between Lumumba and the major Western powers and 
ultimately to his downfall and murder. The Congolese 
national army, led by Joseph Désiré Mobutu,2 and the 
UN peacekeeping mission were unable to put down the 
insurrection until January 1963. In 1977 and 1978 the 
former police (Gendarmes Katangais), of Tshombe’s 
state, under the command of Jean Nguz Karl-I-Bond and 
General Mbumb Nathanael, attacked the southern towns of 
Kolwezi and Moba from Angolan bases. Mobutu defeated 
both rebellions only with the help of foreign troops. 
The separatist drive subsided in the early 1990s, when 
Mobutu stirred tensions between the Luba immigrants 
and the native Katangans in order to weaken his strongest 
opponent, Etienne Tshisekedi, a Luba from Kasai Orientale. 
By then the mining parastatal Gécamines (Général des 
Carrières et des Mines), which had provided housing 
and social services for 33,000 workers, had collapsed 
due to mismanagement. The resulting unemployment 
and poverty provided fertile grounds for recruitment of 
angry youth. Mobutu’s allies in the province blamed the 
 
 
1 For recent reporting on the Congo, see Crisis Group Africa 
Briefing N°34, A Congo Action Plan, 19 October 2005; Crisis 
Group Africa Briefing N°25, The Congo: Solving the FDLR 
Problem Once and for All, 12 May 2005; and Crisis Group 
Africa Report N°91, The Congo’s Transition is Failing: Crisis 
in the Kivus, 30 March 2005. 
2 Mobutu was the army chief of staff until 1965, when he 
proclaimed himself prime minister after a coup d’état. He 
renamed himself Mobutu Sese Seko Kuku Ngbendu Wa Za 
Banga in 1972. 
urban Luba population for stealing their jobs and in 
1992-1993 led ethnic purges during which over 5,000 
people were killed and some 1,350,000 forcibly displaced.  
The 1997 seizure of national power by Laurent Desiré 
Kabila, a Katangan Luba from the north and father of 
the current president, introduced new tensions into the 
province’s politics. Politicians from the north of the 
province came to dominate the security forces as 
well as the administration, creating resentment among 
southerners, who felt deprived of the power and wealth 
concentrated in their region. Instead of promoting 
reconciliation, the state has clamped down with harsh 
security measures. Twice in the past year, authorities 
around President Joseph Kabila have conjured the threat 
of secession in order to arrest and intimidate southern 
politicians. While inter-communal tensions were 
overshadowed during the recent war, the presidential, 
legislative and provincial elections scheduled for March 
2006 have revived them. The Union of Congolese 
Nationalists and Federalists (UNAFEC) has recruited 
large youth groups to intimidate opponents in campaigns 
strongly reminiscent of earlier ethnic violence. President 
Kabila is using UNAFEC to campaign for him in Katanga, 
thus implicitly endorsing their intimidation and hate speech 
tactics.  
The 1998 war also militarised the north of the province. 
Laurent Kabila created local Mai-Mai militias to stop the 
advance of Rwandan-backed forces. While the enemy 
threat has disappeared, the militias have taken on a life of 
their own and are now one of the largest security problems 
in the country.  
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A. THE MAI-MAI OF NORTHERN KATANGA 
The Mai-Mai are the greatest security threat in Katanga 
and the main cause of the displacement of 286,000 
people in the province. More than nineteen warlords in 
the northern and central territories command bands – 
estimated by the UN to total 5,000 to 8,000 – who 
regularly abuse the local population.3 This violence is 
closely linked to figures in the transitional government. 
Officials such as General John Numbi, head of the air 
force, and former Katangan Governor Aimé Ngoy 
Mukena, who helped create and supply these militias, 
now seem unable or unwilling to dismantle them. The 
Mai-Mai commanders in turn do not want to relinquish 
control of local resources and integrate into the national 
army. 
The Mai-Mai are a relatively recent phenomenon in the 
north.4 While as elsewhere in the eastern Congo they are a 
local defence force recruited and organised along tribal 
lines, their emergence in Katanga was not as spontaneous 
as in the Kivus. Northern Katanga was strategically 
significant at the opening of the 1998 war for Laurent 
Kabila, who wanted to prevent the Rwandan army from 
reaching his Kamina military base and the provincial 
capital, Lubumbashi, and so isolate him from his 
home region and important mineral resources. His 
response was to set up armed groups, including the 
Popular Self-Defence Forces (FAP), the Hearts of Steel 
(Moyo wa Chuma) and the Mai-Mai. Senior members 
of his government, including Mwenze Kongolo, Ngoy 
Mukena, John Numbi and Kyungu wa Kumwanza, 
took part in this in 1999.5 The FAP, the most 
notorious, was often led by commanders close to 
Laurent Kabila. Kinshasa distributed light weapons and 
ammunition throughout northern Katanga, without 
training or integrating the new militia into the national 
 
  
3 Crisis Group interview with MONUC official, November 
2005. 
4 The Mai-Mai phenomenon dates back at least to when Pierre 
Mulele and Gaston Soumialot, with the help of young Laurent 
Kabila, led the first Mai-Mai rebellions against the government 
after Patrice Lumumba’s 1961 assassination.  
5 Crisis Group communication with MONUC official, June 
2005. Mwenze Kongolo was minister of justice under Laurent 
Kabila; Ngoy Mukena is the former governor of Katanga; 
John Numbi commanded the UFERI youth militia (JUFERI), 
before he became military commander of the province and 
subsequently air force commander; Kyungu wa Kumwanza 
was Katanga’s governor under Mobutu and is currently a 
deputy in parliament.  
army, then known as the Congolese Armed Forces 
(FAC).  
Following the death of his father in early 2001, Joseph 
Kabila wanted to disband the FAP and ordered its 
integration into the police force. These orders were largely 
ignored, however, especially in the countryside. Indeed, 
authorities such as Governor Aimé Ngoy Mukena and the 
regional commander, General John Numbi, armed other 
groups, especially in Malemba Nkulu territory in the north.  
After the Inter-Congolese Dialogue began in earnest in 
2001, the international community treated Mai-Mai groups 
from the Kivus as independent actors in the transition. 
The peace agreements signed in Sun City and Pretoria in 
2002 granted them positions in the parliament, provincial 
administration and army.6 The Mai-Mai in Katanga, 
however, did not receive the same treatment. Northern 
politicians used family connections7 and weapons 
shipments to keep control of the various militia leaders, 
thus maintaining private militias which could be useful 
should the political transition fail. The absence of a central 
command for the Katangan Mai-Mai and their lack of 
political representation in the transitional institutions have 
made negotiations with them difficult. 
1. Losing control  
By the end of 2002 the Mai-Mai had become a serious 
threat to the local population and a thorn in the side of 
some of the local officials who had armed them but now 
seemed unable to control them. The some nineteen 
different groups, varying in size from 100 to several 
thousand combatants, fought each other as well as the 
national army for control of taxes, poaching opportunities 
in the Upemba National Park and mining concessions.  
In November 2002, Mai-Mai under the command of 
Mukalay Jean “Deux Metres” fell out with army troops in 
Ankoro, Laurent Kabila’s hometown.8 Both sides went on 
a rampage and attacked the local population. According 
to human rights organisations, over 100 civilians were 
killed and 75,000 were displaced.9 While only one of 
 
6 Among the posts given to the Mai-Mai were thirteen seats in 
parliament, the environment ministry, the Katanga governorship, 
and command of the ninth military region in Kisangani. Joseph 
Kabila’s government co-opted many of these officials. 
7 Ngoy Mukena is the uncle of the Mai-Mai commander 
Makabe; John Numbi is the latter’s cousin, and Commander 
Chinja Chinja is his brother-in-law.  
8 According to local sources, the army had begun arresting 
Rwandan Hutus, which led to tensions with the Mai-Mai, 
who had been their allies. When a soldier killed a Mai-Mai, 
the tensions boiled over. 
9 Mark Dummett, “Congo government troops kill 100 
civilians”, Reuters, 21 November 2002. A MONUC 
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many in the province, this particularly serious clash 
forced national authorities to focus greater attention on the 
region.  
Provincial and national authorities sent several 
delegations to negotiate with the Mai-Mai in 2002 and 
2003, but they proved difficult to disarm. Commanders 
are wary of being integrated into a national army, which 
would deploy them outside their home region and in 
which, since they are largely untrained and uneducated, 
they would be sidelined by their colleagues. 
On 15 September 2004, the new governor, Kisula Ngoy, 
organised a round table in Kamina with the Mai-Mai 
and traditional chiefs from the north. However, many of 
the most important Mai-Mai leaders refused to attend for 
fear of arrest10 and sent representatives or only letters. 
The round table’s resolutions turned out to be empty 
promises. Afterwards, relations with the governor 
rapidly deteriorated, when he rejected demands on army 
ranks, civil service positions and education grants for 
demobilised combatants. In addition, little military 
pressure was applied. General Numbi, the air force 
commander, is known to have supervised large arms 
shipments through Lubumbashi airport as recently as 
May 200411 and may well have given some of these 
weapons to the Mai-Mai.12 Without adequate incentives 
to demobilise or force to constrain them, the Mai-Mai 
have continued to abuse the population. 
2. Buying peace with bicycles 
Seizing the opportunity, Pasteur Ngoy Mulunda, once a 
close associate of Laurent Kabila, said he would disarm 
and demobilise the groups by offering bicycles in exchange 
for guns. However, the organisation he created for the 
purpose, the Church Program for Peace and Conflict 
Transformation and Reconciliation (PAREC),13 
 
 
investigation several months later confirmed at least 70 
deaths and said there may have been many more. 
10 Crisis Group interview with MONUC official, June 2005. 
11 UN expert group on the arms embargo report, UN document 
S/2004/551, 15 July 2004, p. 20. 
12 Crisis Group telephone interview with human rights group, 
September 2005. The ammunition and weapons are reported 
to have gone missing from the police camp Mutombo in 
Lubumbashi. 
13 Pasteur Mulunda calls himself the spiritual adviser of 
President Kabila. He formerly had a high position in the 
Methodist Church in Tanzania and Kenya and was close to 
Laurent Kabila for many years. He has used his influence in the 
past to reconcile Joseph Kabila with former opponents such as 
Moise Katumbi, and more recently helped resolve a dispute 
between two mining companies, CHEMAF and Anvil Mining, 
in Lubumbashi. The NGO is affiliated with the New Apostolic 
exacerbated tensions between militias. By February 2005, 
Mulunda had distributed 1,300 bicycles in Haut-Lomami 
district and claimed to have received over 2,000 weapons14 
but few were ever seen or handed over to the authorities.  
Mulunda began negotiations with Mai Mai commanders 
Chinja Chinja and Bakanda Bakoka and, apparently 
authorised to speak for the government, promised them 
army ranks. On 8 February 2005, he hosted a public 
ceremony in Lubumbashi with both commanders, in 
which he claimed to have received 540 machine guns, 
156 grenades and twenty poison arrows in exchange for 
800 bicycles. While Mulunda was successful in the 
towns of Ankoro and Bukama,15 he was chased out of 
Kongolo and denounced by the Mai-Mai of Luena and 
Kamina, who complained they had not received their 
bicycles. On 14-15 March, dissatisfied Mai-Mai who 
had not been offered bicycles went on a rampage in the 
central village of Katala, killing around 30 people and 
displacing 2,000.16 
On 8 April, after much international pressure, in particular 
by MONUC, Chinja Chinja was arrested in Kinshasa for 
human rights abuses. Subsequently, militia activity largely 
ended in his home territory, Kitenge. However, his arrest 
also complicated demobilisation, as other militia leaders 
refused to talk with the authorities, claiming the negotiations 
were a trap. While the new regional commander, General 
Widi Divioka, began talks with Mai Mai General Gédéon 
Kyungu in October 2005, most other commanders still 
operate as autonomous warlords. 
In the meantime, Mulunda’s actions have complicated 
matters for the National Demobilisation and Reintegration 
Commission (CONADER), which is responsible for all 
demobilisation of Congolese armed groups.17 The 
commission found a competing program in the field when 
it became active in Katanga in early 2005. Although 
it opened a demobilisation site in Kamina on 15 August, 
by year’s end no Mai-Mai had been demobilised. A group 
of 300 has been waiting in the Kamina centre for three 
months, receiving little food or health care. Another 400 
are allegedly still waiting to enter the process in Manono.18 
CONADER was supposed to open sites in Kalemie in July 
 
Church, which he founded, and his actions allegedly are closely 
tied to proselytising efforts on behalf of the church. 
14 Associated Press, 18 February 2005 and 5 May 2005. 
15 Crisis Group interview, international NGO, Lubumbashi, 
June 2005. 
16 David Lewis, “Women attacked and mutilated in Congo 
attack”, Reuters, 7 April 2005; Crisis Group interviews with 
humanitarian officials in Lubumbashi, June 2005. 
17 The Congolese national army, FARDC, is responsible for 
the disarmament of such armed groups. 
18 Crisis Group interview with CONADER and state officials, 
November 2005. 
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2005 and Lubumbashi in 2006 but logistical problems 
have produced delays.19  
While transport and logistical problems have plagued 
demobilisation throughout the country, political obstacles 
are also considerable. The Katangan Mai-Mai complain 
that, even though Laurent Kabila and his associates gave 
them preferential treatment during the war, they have 
been refused army positions. Governor Ngoy, supposedly 
named by the Mai-Mai, actually owes his post to pressure 
from Joseph Kabila’s People’s Party for Reconstruction 
and Democracy (PPRD). In mid-November 2004, the 
sixth military region offered Mai-Mai groups the 
opportunity to send fighters to the Kitona army base to 
join the second integrated brigade of the new national 
army (FARDC). Commanders agreed to send 115 but 
refused to leave the bush themselves, and little changed 
on the ground.  
3. The hunt for Gédéon 
In the run-up to elections, the army has begun operations 
against the militias in the eastern Congo who remain 
outside government control. After moving against the 
Congolese Revolutionary Mouvement (MRC) in Ituri and 
Mai-Mai in the Kivus, it attacked Mai-Mai in northern 
Katanga in November 2005. Commander Gédéon, who 
was based around the town of Dubie, was the first target. 
At this point the Mai-Mai had outlived their usefulness for 
 
 
19 A mobile orientation centre was opened at Kalemie in 
August 2005. Former combatants are given the choice to 
return to civilian life or continue in the newly integrated army. 
Upon leaving the camp, demobilised combatants receive $110 
in cash ($50 for transport, $10 for rations, and a $50 subsidy). 
CONADER also follows-up on demobilised combatants, who 
receive a monthly allowance of $25 for a year and vocational 
training. The centre is financed by the Multi-country 
Demobilization and Reintegration Program (MDRP), a multi-
agency effort hosted by the World Bank that supports the 
demobilisation and reintegration of ex-combatants in seven 
countries of the Great Lakes region. In the Congo, the program 
was allocated $200 million and has been in existence since 
November 2004, though implementation has gone slowly. 
Transportation is often poor, irregular or non-existent and 
costs substantially more than the $50 allowance. As a result, 
former combatants often spend days or weeks without shelter 
or food (unless NGOs intervene) in orientation centres meant 
to host them for only a day. Only one of the three fixed centres 
in Katanga is operational, and only two agencies have 
been approved to ensure the professional training of former 
combatants. CONADER has also experienced difficulties with 
payment of the monthly allowances; once they return to the 
countryside, former combatants are difficult to locate, and 
disbursement facilities are often non-existent. Of the 1,200 
fighters demobilised by November 2005, only 827 have 
received their monthly allowance. Crisis Group interviews 
with CONADER officials in the Congo, November 2005. All 
references to dollars ($) refer to U.S. dollars. 
former patrons, and their abuses were making some leaders 
of the Katangan Luba (“Lubakat”) in Kinshasa, including 
Joseph Kabila, unpopular with the local population. 
Local sources have criticised the army for deploying to 
Dubie while Gédéon himself is said to be 75 km away in 
Kato. Its behaviour has also been of concern: $245,000 
in pay promised by army leaders had not materialised by 
early December, and soldiers were beginning to harass 
residents. The operations have displaced 25,000 people, 
adding to 70,000 previous IDPs in the area, but a local 
commander professed indifference to the problems, 
saying “you can’t make an omelette without breaking 
some eggs”.20 MONUC was busy preparing the 
constitutional referendum21 and lacked the logistics and 
spare troops to assist.  
B. THE POLITICS OF IDENTITY 
Identity is the primary means used to rally support in 
Katangan politics, and appeals to ethnicity will become 
more prominent during the election campaign. There 
are two major fault lines. 
1. The conflict between “Originaires” and 
“Non-Originaires”  
Major immigration to Katanga began with the 
establishment of the mining industry in 1906. Belgium 
imported labour from other parts of the colony, partly due 
to the lack of skilled local workers, but also in the hope 
that this would produce a more docile force. Immigrants 
from as far as Rwanda were brought to the mining cities 
of Kolwezi, Kambove, Likasi, Lubumbashi, Kipushi, and 
Shinkolobwe.22 Most, however, were from the Luba ethnic 
group of Kasai, in particular from the poor and neglected 
south east. At independence, the Luba ran much of the 
administration and business sector of the province, creating 
discontent and antagonism among other communities.23 
Moise Tshombe and his CONAKAT movement used 
the discontent to demand more power for locals in the 
administration, and tensions between him and the Luba 
were aggravated at independence when the Kasaian 
 
20 Crisis Group interview with local FARDC commander, 
November 2005. 
21 Congolese voters gave more than 80 per cent approval to a 
new constitution on 18-19 December 2005. MONUC dedicated 
many of its resources, in particular air assets and troops, to help 
with conduct of the referendum, including voter registration. 
22 Kabuya Lumuna Sando, Nord-Katanga 1960-1964, de la 
sécession à la guerre civile, le meurtre des chefs (Paris, 
1992), p. 12.  
23 The Luba today are 20 per cent of the total Katangan 
population and 40 per cent of Lubumbashi’s. 
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community sided with Patrice Lumumba against the 
secessionist south. Katanga’s interior minister, Godefroid 
Munongo, orchestrated the first ethnic cleansing operations 
against the Luba, and the UN evacuated much of the 
community from the province.24  
Manipulation of ethnicity continued even after Mobutu 
crushed secession. With a weak state and little popular 
support, identity became one of the main rallying cries 
of his regime, which used ethnic cleavages to divide the 
opposition and increased the number of Kasaians in 
Katanga’s public administration, as well as the army and 
police, in the 1980s. With much of the repressive state 
apparatus and the mines under control of these “outsiders”, 
native Katangans formed the Katangan Foundation, while 
communities from other provinces set up their own 
Cultural Association of Non-Originaires in order to 
defend their interests.  
These ethnic and regional divisions provided the backdrop 
for the violence of the 1990s. As Mobutu’s rule began to 
crumble and his financial resources dwindled with 
the loss of Cold War alliances, he was forced to make 
concessions to the pro-democracy movement. Political 
opposition and civil society leaders participated in the 
National Sovereign Conference (CNS) in 1991-1992 that 
was to guide the transition. Mobutu’s main foe was Etienne 
Tshisekedi, the Kasaian leader of Union for Democracy 
and Social Progress (UDPS). To divide the opposition, 
Mobutu lured the Katangan Jean Nguz Karl-I-Bond away 
from Tshisekedi’s coalition, appointed him prime minister 
in November 1991 and named his close associate, Gabriel 
Kyungu wa Kumwanza, governor of Katanga. Together 
the prime minister and governor set about recruiting 
unemployed Katangan youth into their new political party, 
the Union of Federalists and Independent Republicans 
(UFERI), and its youth militia (JUFERI).  
Katanga’s economy fell into depression after the collapse 
of Gécamines in the late 1980s, leaving thousands 
unemployed. This provided fertile ground for JUFERI 
recruitment. When the CNS elected Tshisekedi prime 
minister in 1992, UFERI adopted an explicit policy of 
ethnic cleansing against the Luba in Katanga’s major 
mining cities, in particular Kolwezi. Governor Kyungu 
led the campaign, blaming the Luba for the economic 
woes and accusing them of trying to steal power in 
Katanga after already having done so in Kinshasa. 
According to the UN, the JUFERI militia killed over 5,000 
 
 
24 Georges Nzongola-Ntalaja, “States, Borders and Nations”, 
paper presented at Annual Conference, Centre of African 
Studies, University of Edinburgh, 19-20 May 2004. The UN 
forces belonged to the UN Mission to the Congo (MONUC). 
and displaced around 1,350,000 in 1992 and 1993.25 The 
provincial security forces detained over 75,000 people in 
inhumane conditions before humanitarian organisations 
evacuated them to Kasai, where most had never set foot.  
Over the past few years, tensions have decreased and 
many Kasaians have returned to Lubumbashi and Likasi, 
though not to Kolwezi where most killings took place. 
There is, however, remarkably little public discussion 
of the violence. Many “native” Katangans believe that, 
although the attacks on Kasaians were a terrible thing, 
they helped them regain control of the provincial economy. 
Kasaians, especially those who lived through the ethnic 
cleansing, approach the election campaign cautiously 
but the younger generation resents its community’s 
exclusion from power in the province, and many have 
joined the UDPS. Tensions between native Katangans 
and Kasaians have now crystallised into a new, violent 
rivalry between the UDPS and UNAFEC parties.  
2. The division between north and south 
In the Katangan political imagination, the province 
is divided into north (Tanganyika and Haut-Lomami 
districts) and south (Kolwezi, Haut-Katanga and Lualaba 
districts).26 There are ethnic differences between the two 
regions: the north is predominantly Lubakat and Hemba, 
while the south is settled mostly by the Lunda, Bemba 
and Songwe tribes. The regions are economically distinct 
as well. The northern economy is almost completely 
agricultural – it is sometimes called the “useless Katanga” 
by southerners – while copper and cobalt mines give the 
south much greater revenue sources.27 Southerners resent 
the predominance of northerners in both the provincial 
and national arenas and believe that their mineral wealth 
entitle them to greater representation in Lubumbashi and 
Kinshasa.  
These political differences first surfaced in 1960, when 
the northern members of the provincial assembly sided 
with the nationalist first president of the Congo, Patrice 
Lumumba, against the secessionist southerners. After 
Tshombe launched his independence movement, northern 
politicians created a youth militia, the Balubakat Youth of 
Katanga (JEBAKAT).28 When Katanga seceded, the north 
declared an independent Popular Republic of Lualaba, 
 
25 Report on the situation of Human Rights in Zaïre presented 
by Roberto Garreton, UN Special Rapporteur, December 1994, 
UN Documents E/CN.4/1995/67, mainly sections 107 and 108. 
26 Kabuya Lumuna, op.cit., p. 23 
27 Notable exceptions are a cement factory in Kabimba and 
cassiterite mines around Manono. 
28 Eric Kennes and Munkana N’ge, Essai bibliographique sur 
Laurent-Désiré Kabila (Paris, 2003), p. 54. 
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which Tshombe’s troops put an end to in March 1961 by 
seizing its capital, Manono.29 
While north-south tensions died down under Mobutu, 
they reappeared under Laurent Kabila. His father was 
from the north and his mother from the south but he 
and his son Joseph have favoured northerners in their 
governments. Of the past six governors of Katanga, one, 
Katumba Mwanke, has been a southerner, five have been 
Lubakat.30 Only seven of the 45 administrative, justice 
and security directors in the provincial government are 
southerners. 
When Laurent Kabila came to power in 1997, a large 
part of his troops were south Katangans, the so-called 
“Katangan Tigers”, descendents of Tshombe’s forces, 
who fled the province after secession was put down.31 
Around 2,000 of these joined the insurrection against 
Mobutu. From the early days, however, conflicts arose 
between them and Laurent Kabila. In 1997, as his 
rebels approached Kinshasa, Kabila arrested Jean 
Delphin Muland, a top Katangan commander, along 
with twenty other officers in Lubumbashi, allegedly for 
indiscipline. Fearful of losing power to the group, he 
sidelined the Tigers when he formed his government. 
Some of their commanders resent that after fighting for 
the new Kinshasa regime for seven years, they now 
have less power than the politicians.  
While these troops form a large part of the presidential 
guard, Joseph Kabila is wary of a coup and has further 
marginalised southern Katangan officers. The blame for 
Laurent Kabila’s assassination in 2001, for example, 
was partly attributed to southern Katangans; Eddy 
Kapend, a former Katangan Tiger, remains in prison as 
the accused master-mind. Celestin Kifwa, the south 
Katangan head of the presidential guard, was suspended 
in June 2004 after a botched coup in Kinshasa.32 The 
Kilwa incident in October 2004 and an alleged secession 
attempt in Katanga in April 2005, both described below, 
provided pretexts for further arrests of southerners. 
 
 
29 Ibid, p. 79. 
30 Kyungu wa Kumwanza, Gaëtan Kakudji, Thadée Ngoie 
Mulume, Aimé Ngoie Mukena and Kisula Ngoie. 
31 Several generations of southerners served in the Angolan 
army after Tshombe’s Gendarmes Katangais fled into exile in 
1964 and 1965 and were joined by local youth angry with 
Mobutu. They were used by the Portuguese to fight against 
Angolan independence but soon sided with the MPLA against 
the Mobutu-backed UNITA and FNLA in that struggle. They 
were trained by the Angolan army and later given rudimentary 
support to launch their attacks into Zaire in 1977 and 1978. 
32 Most observers concluded that the attempt, carried out by 
Major Eric Lenge, a presidential guard commander, and several 
dozen soldiers, was either staged or intended merely to scare the 
president. Kifwa was later given a different position.  
Many southerners feel the coming elections are an 
opportunity to gain greater political representation. 
During a television broadcast on RTNC/Katanga in May 
2004, a group of southern politicians denounced the 
nomination of Governor Ngoy because he was Lubakat.33 
When Joseph Kabila visited Lubumbashi in the wake of 
the alleged April 2005 secession plot, southern politicians 
presented him with similar complaints. 
While these tensions are not very prevalent among the 
general population, they have become part of the 
language of Katangan politicians, who use them to 
elicit fear and rally support. Authorities in Kinshasa 
and Lubumbashi also use the north-south issue in part 
as a pretext to display their strength before elections.34 
3. Urban unrest and electoral competition 
The various conflicts in the province have set the stage 
for a tense electoral season. While all major Congolese 
parties are represented in Katanga, only a few have 
significant support. The main players in the presidential 
elections will be UNAFEC, which will probably back 
Kabila, UDPS and PPRD. The other two main former 
belligerents, the Movement for the Liberation of the Congo 
(MLC) and the Rally for Congolese Democracy (RCD), 
are weak in Katanga.35 Smaller provincial parties such 
as the National Congolese Confederation (CONACO)36 
and the National Union of Congolese Federalists 
(UNADEF) could get support in the legislative and local 
elections but risk being outmatched by the larger parties’ 
resources. It is possible, however, that a coalition of smaller 
parties from the south could rally against Kabila with the 
support of civil society groups like Solidarité Katangaise.  
 
33 The broadcast was on 24 May 2004. “Sécession du 
Katanga, premier mai 2005”, Action Contre l’Impunité pour 
les Droits Humains, p. 7. 
34Crisis Group interviews with diplomats and Congolese 
authorities, Kinshasa, June and July 2005. 
35 MLC is the party of former politicians from UFERI who 
sided with former Prime Minister Nguz Karl-I-Bond against 
Kyungu when the party split in 1996. As a consequence, and 
even though MLC seeks to attract moderate Luba voters 
from Kamina, it relies chiefly on supporters from Lualaba, 
the home district of its current leader, Jacques Mudib Nguz. 
RCD’s Katanga chairman is Banza Mukalay. It is considered 
the party of the Banyamulenge from the high plateau in the 
north. Its reputation was tarnished by crimes committed 
during the war and its pro-Rwandan bias. In Lubumbashi, its 
supporters are predominantly activists who have no other 
option or opportunists who rallied behind the party in 2003 
to secure a position in the transitional parliament. 
36 CONACO is run by Andre Tshombe and is similar in its 
policies and rhetoric to the party of his father, Moise Tshombe. 
UNADEF is run by Christian Mwando and has a small 
constituency in the south of the province. 
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The only substantive difference between the three main 
parties in Katanga is over the constitution; UDPS and 
UNAFEC support a federalist political system, while the 
PPRD has endorsed the model of a unitary state enshrined 
in the constitution that was approved by the December 
2005 referendum.37 As elsewhere in the country, the 
campaign will be based on ethnicity and questioning the 
reputations of opponents. That kind of rhetoric, especially 
between parties with strong ethnic affiliations such as 
UNAFEC and UDPS, is likely to provoke violence. 
UNAFEC was set up in 2001 during the Sun City 
negotiations and is led in the province by Gabriel Kyungu 
wa Kumwanza, a populist, and at the national level by the 
more moderate justice minister, Honorius Kisimba Ngoy. 
Many senior UNAFEC figures were also members of 
UFERI during the ethnic purges of the early 1990s. The 
party enjoys majority support among the Balubakat 
and Bahemba ethnic groups, who are 30 per cent of the 
Katangan population. Its youth wing, JUNAFEC, which 
will be used to rally support, provide security during 
demonstrations and intimidate opponents, has nine 
constituent groups, with, according to their leaders, 
around 4,500 members in the province.38 
After Kyungu failed in May 2004 to be reappointed 
governor, he announced he would run against Joseph 
Kabila for the presidency. For several months UNAFEC 
supporters regularly accused Kabila and PPRD members 
in Kinshasa of having betrayed Katangan interests. In 
September 2004, however, Kyungu announced that he 
would run Kabila’s campaign in Katanga.39 The party 
will nonetheless campaign separately and against the 
PPRD in the legislative and local elections. This two-
pronged approach has riled many in the PPRD who 
disapprove of Kyungu’s incendiary rhetoric and style. In 
September 2005, supporters of the two parties clashed at 
a funeral in Lubumbashi.40 
The main potential for violence, however, is between 
UNAFEC and two other groups: the UDPS, representing 
the interests of most Kasaians in the province; and 
Solidarité Katangaise, which, although an NGO and not 
a political party, has positioned itself as an important 
political actor rallying southern interests.  
 
 
37 This was highlighted in December 2004 when a delegation 
of senators came to Lubumbashi to consult on the drafting of 
the new constitution. 
38 These groups include the Brigade des Martyrs, Zoulous, 
GSS, Les Enfants Perdus, Brigade Rouge, Les Invisibles, Les 
Amazones and the Scorpions. Crisis Group interview, Jean 
Umba, president of JUNAFEC, Lubumbashi, June 2005. 
39 Crisis Group interviews with civil society in Lubumbashi, 
June 2005. 
40 “Bagarre autour des funerailles d’un proche du PPRD et 
celui de l’UNAFEC”, Radio Okapi, 13 September 2005. 
While there have been no authoritative polls in Katanga, 
UDPS’s close rivalry with the PPRD in Kinshasa – most 
national polls show Tshisekedi leading Kabila41 – has 
carried over to the president’s home province. The 
UDPS has its own group of “combatants” to organise 
demonstrations and protect the leaders. During 2004 and 
2005, JUNAFEC groups often interrupted UDPS meetings 
and clashed with its members. During a June 2005 incident 
in Lubumbashi, a member of the Congolese security 
services was part of a JUNAFEC group that attacked 
UDPS offices, thus tending to confirm the complicity of 
some local authorities in the skirmishes.42 Accusing the 
government of mismanaging the transition and skewing 
the electoral process, Tshisekedi insists he will not 
participate in the March elections. Whether he does or 
not, the UDPS-UNAFEC rivalry will be a source of 
tension in the province. 
The second target of UNAFEC is Solidarité Katangaise, 
an NGO involved mostly in civic education and 
development which has recently gained more public 
visibility. It is led by the head of the Lubumbashi bar, 
Jean-Claude Muyambo,43 and claims several thousand 
members.44 While it is mostly active in the south – 
Muyambo also leads Sempya, the cultural association of 
the Babemba, Balamba and Balala ethnic groups there – it 
began development projects and education programs in 
2005 in the central and northern regions. Some Katangan 
authorities fear Muyambo will use his organisation to 
rally support during the elections and have tried to 
intimidate him on numerous occasions.45 In June 2005, 
Solidarité Katangaise’s NGO registration was suspended 
by the governor’s office, which accused Muyambo of 
political involvement. On 17 August 2005, JUNAFEC 
youths from the Zoulou group tried to burn Solidarité’s 
office in Lubumbashi before police dispersed them. The 
greater Muyambo’s support, the greater the threat he 
poses for UNAFEC and Kabila. His importance rose 
when he hosted Olivier Kamitatu, the national assembly 
 
41 According to a poll conducted by Facilitas Consulting in 
various provinces of the country in August 2005, Tshisekedi 
would win 26 per cent of the vote in the presidential election, 
followed by Joseph Kabila with 17 per cent, while over 30 per 
cent of the electorate did not have a favourite. In legislative 
elections, UDPS would win 32 per cent, followed by PPRD 
with 20 per cent. 
42 Crisis Group witnessed this event on 25 June 2005. 
43 Muyambo is the co-founder of the Centre for Human 
Rights in Lubumbashi. He has also served as a legal adviser 
in the ministry of mines under Laurent Kabila.  
44 Crisis Group interview with Jean-Claude Muyambo, 
Lubumbashi, June 2005 
45 Crisis Group interviews with local NGOs, Lubumbashi, 
June 2005. 
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president and a key player in the elections,46 during an 
October 2005 visit. 
UNAFEC’s statements have become increasingly hostile 
in recent months. In October 2005, while inaugurating a 
new office in Lubumbashi, a party youth leader, Juvenal 
Kitungwa, denounced on local television those who want 
to divide Katangans.47 He singled out “certain albinos”, 
by which he seemed to refer to Muyambo, who is half 
Dutch, and said: “they are snakes. We have the 
obligation, we the Brigades des Martyrs, to grab them and 
to burn them with tyres around their necks”. His 
colleague, Umba Lungange, denounced Muyambo as “a 
bat, half mouse, half bird. How can the bats give the 
animal advice? How can it give a bird advice?…If you 
see one here, trap it, burn it and eat it.…Katanga is for the 
sons of Katanga to rule”.48 While Solidarité Katangaise 
has not announced an intention to support candidates 
during the elections, UNAFEC obviously feels threatened 
by its popularity. 
The weakness of the authorities’ response to the hate 
discourse raises questions about their possible complicity. 
Following an outcry by MONUC and diplomats in 
Lubumbashi, the provincial governor denounced the 
language, while Minister of Justice Ngoy, who is also 
UNAFEC’s president, demanded an investigation. 
However, he did so in his function as party head and has 
not tasked the state prosecutor.49 Although they have been 
temporarily banned from broadcasting on TV and radio, 
Kitungwa and Lungange are still JUNAFEC members 
and blame MONUC for exaggerating the matter. The 
High Media Authority, the transitional institution in 
charge of regulating the media, shut the local station 
(RTIV) that carried their remarks for fifteen days, a 
period deemed insufficient by many diplomats and local 
NGOs. For comparison, around the same time it banned 
two newspapers in Kinshasa for three months after they 
published a story alleging that Kabila had donated money 
to schools in Tanzania.50  
The statements of the JUNAFEC officials are strongly 
reminiscent of language used by UFERI during the ethnic 
cleansing of the early 1990s. This is not surprising, as 
some of that movement’s old leaders are at the helm of 
UNAFEC, including Kyungu wa Kumwanza and General 
 
 
46 Kamitatu is an important member of the MLC but was 
rumoured in November 2005 to be preparing to leave the 
party to form an alliance with several other figures, including 
Muyambo.  
47 Juvenal Kitungwa is JUNAFEC’s provincial president, while 
Umba Lungange is UNAFEC’s acting provincial president. 
48 The remarks were broadcast by Radio Télévision Inter 
Viens et Vois on 8 October 2005. 
49 Crisis Group telephone interview with diplomats, Kinshasa 
and Lubumbashi, 12 November 2005. 
50 Ibid. 
John Numbi. While it is unlikely UNAFEC would 
unleash similar violence, a close eye should be kept on its 
actions and rhetoric to prevent escalation of tensions.  
C. KINSHASA IN KATANGA: JOCKEYING 
FOR POWER BEFORE ELECTIONS 
1. The politics of mining  
Katanga is by far the Congo’s richest province, with 34 
per cent of the cobalt and 10 per cent of the copper 
reserves in the world. Under Mobutu, Gécamines 
controlled mining and employed more than 33,00051 but 
since 1993, its infrastructure has all but collapsed, and 
production of copper and cobalt is a tiny fraction of 
previous output.52 Although a few large international 
firms are returning, much of the mining is still artisanal.53 
The collapse of Gécamines forced it to enter into 
partnerships with small, questionable entrepreneurs that 
opened the mining sector to rackets. After Laurent Kabila 
gained power in 1997, access to mining operations became 
largely dependent on political connections with Kinshasa. 
Having originally authorised artisanal mining, he gave the 
Zimbabwe government access to Gécamines through 
intermediaries in return for military support against 
Rwanda and the RCD rebels. Zimbabwe, represented by 
Billy Rautenbach, who was made director of Gécamines 
in 1999, failed to profit from the nearly defunct parastatal, 
and the Kabila government began to engage in joint 
ventures with small foreign companies.  
The three reports of the UN Panel on the Illegal 
Exploitation of Natural Resources in the DRC describe 
how officials close to the presidency helped foreign 
companies gain access to Gécamines concessions on 
 
51 George J. Coakley, “The Mineral Industry of Congo 
(Kinshasa)”, U.S. Geological Survey, 2002. 
52 Gécamines was forced to fire two thirds of its staff, reducing 
it to 10,000. The World Bank funded a $40 million early 
retirement scheme, which proved inadequate, because it did not 
take into account the social, medical and educational role played 
by the company. 
53 For an in-depth discussion of artisanal mining in Katanga, 
see “Rush and Ruin – The Devestating Mineral Trade in 
Southern Katanga, DRC”, Global Witness, September 2004 
and “La paix sous tension: dangereux et illicite commerce de 
la cassitérite dans l’est de la RDC”, Global Witness, June 
2005. The large remaining industrial mining firms are Forrest 
Malta, owned by a Belgian national born in the Congo; Anvil 
Mining, an Australian firm listed on the Toronto stock 
exchange; and two U.S. firms, OM Group, Inc. and American 
Mineral Fields. Other companies have acquired concessions 
and mining rights not begun operations. 
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lucrative terms.54 While by Congolese law all foreign 
mining operations must be joint ventures, officials often 
sign away concessions at undervalued rates in exchange 
for a commission. The UN and human rights groups 
have also accused foreign firms of not respecting the 
contractual terms for dividing profits.55 Local NGOs 
accuse foreign investors of satisfying the authorities by 
paying generous commissions or making company shares 
available so they can breach mining and environmental 
regulations.56 
In 2002, the Congolese government published a new 
mining code that was developed with World Bank help 
and intended to attract foreign investors with low tax rates. 
It also streamlined the process of acquiring concessions 
by creating a standard template for contracts and setting 
clear environmental, labour and financial guidelines. The 
World Bank hoped that Gécamines would be gradually 
privatised, the rationale underlying the attractive tax 
guidelines. However, most mining operations are still 
small joint ventures with modest foreign investors of 
limited means. Corruption and the uncertain security 
environment have deterred bigger investments, although 
the situation has begun to change, and mining experts 
predict more interest after the elections.57  
While the mining code dictates the conditions under 
which all newcomers operate, older contracts remain 
valid. Some of these include tax exemptions or authorise 
export of non-processed minerals, which has been 
forbidden by presidential decree since 2003. In addition, 
artisanal miners and custom officials are easily cheated, as 
they have no means to measure the mineral concentration. 
 
 
54 Victor Mpoyo (minister to the presidency), Mwenze 
Kongolo (nminister of national security) and Katumba 
Mwanke (minister to the presidency after Mpoyo) were 
suspended from their government positions by Joseph Kabila 
after being cited by the UN Panel of Experts. Kongolo and 
Mpoyo left public service to found the M-17 political party, 
while Mwanke was soon brought back as a roving 
ambassador. “Final report of the Panel of Experts on the 
Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of 
Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo”, 17 
October 2002, UN S/2002/1146, pp. 7-8.  
55 For example, the Scories de Terril de Lubumbashi (STL) 
factory allegedly has not shared profits from certain mineral 
processing with Gécamines, ibid, p. 10 
56 Crisis Group electronic communication, human rights NGO, 
October 2005.  
57 The most notable new investment is the purchase of the 
Tenke Fungurume mining concession by the U.S. company 
Phelps Dodge in 2005 for $1.6 billion. Tenke contains some 
of the highest grade copper in the world and is expected to 
produce around 800,000 tons of ore annually by 2015, twice 
what Gecamines produced at its peak in the 1970s. David 
Lewis, “Congo’s Gecamines nears Phelps deal – CEO”, 
Reuters, 29 August 2005.  
This represents a significant loss for Katanga. Its two 
refineries are now nearly at a stand-still as most minerals 
are exported unrefined for processing abroad.58  
The lax application of mining laws has allowed prominent 
members of the transitional government to remain involved 
in managing public resources. Katumba Mwanke, one of 
those criticised by the UN Panel of Experts and now a 
roving ambassador, is said to have used his leverage in 
government to obtain substantial tax exemptions for a 
mining company on whose board of executives he sat 
until recently.59 Similarly, Vice President Yerodia 
Ndombasi allegedly intervened through his legal adviser 
on behalf of a company in which he holds shares when it 
was accused of polluting Lubumbashi’s water supply in 
2004.60 While a property register was set up in Kinshasa 
in 2004 to cut out individual interference in the acquisition 
of mines, international businessmen say all important 
deals are still negotiated with senior politicians.61 
Customs fraud has been prevalent. Minerals such as 
copper and heterogenite are smuggled uninspected and 
untaxed across the border into Zambia with the 
complicity of customs officers. Local organisations have 
accused Governor Ngoy of responsibility for such fraud 
at the Kasumbalesa crossing. A review of the National 
Customs Office (OFIDA) by Crown Agents consultancy 
in 2004 reported that large amounts of goods leaked 
undeclared through customs and constituted the Congo’s 
largest source of revenue loss.62 A comparison of official 
Congolese export and Chinese import statistics for 
cobalt and copper trade in April and May 2004, for 
example, showed a greater than ten-fold difference.63 As 
 
58 Crisis Group interview with international businessman, 
Kinshasa, November 2005. An example given was the 
continued payment of 4 per cent export tax as opposed to the 
2 per cent tax stated in the mining code.  
59 Crisis Group interviews with local authorities and diplomats, 
Kinshasa and Lubumbashi, June-July 2005 and documentation 
on file with Crisis Group. Mwanke stepped down from the 
board of executives of Anvil Mining Limited shortly after the 
Kilwa incident (see below). He is also said to be involved in 
managing President Kabila’s personal funds. For the UN Panel 
of Experts on Mwanke, see fn. 54 above.  
60 Crisis group interviews with local NGOs and UN officials, 
Lubumbashi and Kinshasa, June 2005. The company concerned 
was Société Minière du Katanga (SOMIKA). See also “Dossier 
SOMIKA: Les Lushois derriere Kisula Ngoy contre Yerodia 
Ndombasi”, Katanga News, 6 November 2004, at 
http://www.katanga news.com/societe09.htm. 
61 Crisis Group interview with international mining officials, 
Kinshasa, November 2005. 
62 “Rush and Ruin”, op. cit., p. 12. 
63 Reliable data is scarce but millions of dollars in revenue 
from copper and cobalt are conservatively estimated to be 
lost every month. Local NGOs such as LICOF (Ligue Contre 
la Corruption et la Fraude) and LISCO (Ligue Congolese 
Katanga: The Congo’s Forgotten Crisis 





larger mining companies return to Katanga and the 
financial stakes rise, so will the potential for corruption 
and possible implication of international companies in 
mining-related violence.  
2. The Kilwa incident 
The Kilwa incident offers insight into how close the 
connection is between politicians, commercial interests 
and conflict. In the early hours of the morning of 14 
October 2004, the lakeside town was attacked and 
captured by combatants led by Alain Kazadi Mukalayi. 
According to investigations by MONUC and local human 
rights organisations, Kazadi had ten to 30 accomplices 
with only a handful of weapons. He held a public meeting 
and declared that he was the leader of the Revolutionary 
Movement for the Liberation of Katanga (MRLK), which 
had the blessing of President Kabila and the nearby 
FARDC commander, Colonel Ademar Ilunga. He then 
distributed money to the local population, recruited 
soldiers and sacked local government offices.64  
Two days later, to Kazadi’s surprise, Colonel Ademar 
Ilunga attacked the insurgents from his base in nearby 
Pweto. While there was no resistance, the FARDC troops 
rounded up local civilians, accused them of collaboration, 
and killed many. A MONUC investigation and local 
human rights group put the death toll at more than 100.65  
The way the attack was conducted suggests manipulation 
by local and national officials. Shortly before, Anvil 
Mining, an Australian company whose shares are traded 
on the Toronto stock exchange, broke off negotiations with 
Ademar’s brigade regarding security for its warehouse. 
These talks were allegedly at the behest of General John 
 
 
pour la Sauvegarde des droits des Consommateurs) have 
reported numerous cases over the last two years. Their 
revelations pave the way for populist politicians to 
manipulate popular frustration. The massive dimensions of 
the tax leakage are suggested by the discrepancies described 
above in trade with China. “Rapport préliminaire sur 
l’exploitation illégale des ressources naturelles en RD Congo 
– le pillage s’intensifie”, ASADHO/Katanga, July 2004; 
“Rush and Ruin”, op. cit., p. 13. 
64 Crisis Group interviews with local NGOs and UN 
officials, Lubumbashi, June 2005. For more information on 
the Kilwa uprising, see “Rapport sur les violations des droits 
de l’homme commises a Kilwa au mois d’octobre 2004”, 
ASADHO/Katanga, January 2005. 
65 “Sixteenth Report of the Secretary-General on the United 
Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo”, 
UN Security Council S/2004/1034, December 2004, p. 4; 
“Rapport sur les violations des droits de l’homme”, op. cit., 
pp. 13-15. 
Numbi, who took an avid interest.66 During the previous 
month, many FARDC troops stationed locally were 
withdrawn to Kolwezi, apparently on his orders. While he 
currently commands the air force, Numbi formerly was 
the regional military commander and often is involved in 
Katangan military affairs. The day before Kazadi’s arrival, 
Ademar moved heavy weapons and some of his children 
out of town, and the local administrator evacuated his 
personal belongings.67 According to a witness, when 
Ademar saw Kazadi in the hospital on 16 October, Kazadi 
exclaimed: “You betrayed me!”68 He died in detention 
several days later of wounds sustained during the fighting. 
While the real motives behind the attack on Kilwa and its 
recapture are difficult to pin down, it is likely the fighting 
was used by Lubumbashi and Kinshasa politicians. The 
affair may have been intended as a reminder of Numbi’s 
strength in the province and been directed at his rivals, 
including Katumba Mwanke, a close counsellor of 
President Kabila who was until recently on Anvil 
Mining’s board, and other southern politicians such as 
Katebe Katoto, who had interests in the company.69 The 
incident was an opportunity for authorities to settle scores 
and extort money; in the subsequent weeks some dozen 
individuals – many of them southern Katangans – were 
arrested for alleged association with Kazadi although 
these links were often flimsy or non-existent. MONUC 
concluded: “It is tempting to believe that this group was 
not an uncontrolled group within a global separatist 
movement, but the easy prey of a group of manipulators 
who wanted to create a situation of instability in Kilwa 
and in fact play a double game”.70 
Anvil Mining denies any wrongdoing.71 While it 
allowed the army to use its vehicles and airplanes during 
 
66 Crisis group interview with diplomats in Lubumbashi and 
Kinshasa, June/July 2005. Numbi reportedly asked for $150 
per solider per month and was turned down by Anvil.  
67 “Rapport sur les violations des droits de l’homme”, op. cit. 
p. 10; Crisis Group interview, UN officials, Lubumbashi and 
Kinshasa, June/July 2005. 
68 Crisis Group interview with diplomats, Lubumbashi and 
Kinshasa, June/July 2005. It seems that Kazadi believed he had 
been betrayed, just as he had believed that he had Kabila’s 
support. He later went to the Médecins Sans Frontières office to 
ask to speak on its HF radio in the belief that the transmission 
would then be broadcast over Radio France Internationale. 
69 Katebe Katoto leased machines to Anvil Mining. See below 
for further description of Katebe’s importance in Katanga. 
70 “Report on the conclusions of the special investigation into 
allegations of summary executions and other violations of 
human rights committed by the FARDC in Kilwa on October 
15, 2004”, MONUC, Kinshasa, available at http://abc.net.au/ 
4corners/content/2005/MONUC_report_oct05.pdf. 
71 For Anvil Mining’s statement, see http://www.anvil.com.au 
/documents/2005August23AnvilConfirmsThatAllegationsAre
Unfounded.pdf.  
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the affair, it claims it did so at gunpoint, although the 
UN investigation suggests its statements have been 
contradictory.72 The World Bank has supported Anvil 
Mining by giving it insurance worth $10 million in 2005 
through the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency 
(MIGA)73 but has been accused by NGOs of not 
conducting a thorough investigation into the company’s 
role in the massacre74 and has asked an ombudsman to 
look into the matter. MONUC refused to publish the 
findings of its thorough investigation until recently, 
limiting itself to a press statement.75 Whatever the full 
story, the Kilwa events indicate that business interests, if 
poorly managed, can contribute to destabilisation of the 
peace process and thus are another reason why it is 
important for bilateral and multilateral donors to support 
reform in the country. 
3. The April 2005 secession attempt76 
In late April 2005, the police and army carried out high-
profile arrests in Lubumbashi. André Tshombe, the son 
of Moise Tshombe, who had tried and failed to make 
Katanga independent in the 1960s, was arrested along 
with several businessmen, a university professor and 30 
FARDC officers. To the surprise of many locals, the 
government announced on 9 May that it had foiled 
another secession attempt.77 It claimed that Tshombe 
had been preparing a rebellion and those arrested had 
purchased several thousand machetes. At the same time, 
Jean-Claude Muyambo of Solidarité Katangaise was 
threatened by local officials and ordered not to leave 
town. President Kabila and General Numbi arrived 




72 “Report on the conclusions of the special investigation”, 
op. cit., p. 9. According to the UN report, Anvil wrote in 
December 2004 to its shareholders that “the response from 
the military and the government both on the provincial and 
national level has been swift and of great assistance in the 
speedy resumption of operations”.  
73 Eliah Giffenbaum and Shannon Lawrence, “The World 
Bank in the Democratic Republic of the Congo”, 
Environmental Defense, available at www.ed.org, p. 3. 
74 “World Bank support for extractives: complicity in human 
rights violations?” Bretton Woods Update, September/ 
October 2005, p. 1. 
75 The report is now available upon written request to the 
Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Ambassador 
William Swing.  
76 A thorough account is in “Secession du Katanga, premier 
mai 2005”, Action Contre l’Impunité pour les Droits Humans, 
May 2005. 
77 “Thirty arrested in alleged secession attempt”, IRIN News, 
9 May 2005. 
No evidence has ever been produced but the alleged 
plot allowed authorities to arrest or intimidate many 
southerners who could be seen as rivals in the 2006 
elections. Tshombe had links to the Katangan Tigers, 
of which an estimated 14,000 are rumoured still to be 
in Angola. According to local journalists and NGOs, 
he had several times contacted the Tigers in 2004 on 
Kabila’s behalf to encourage them to return home.78 
He is also the president of CONACO, a prominent 
political party in Lubumbashi, and hoped to receive 
support from Belgian parties for its 2006 campaign in 
Katanga.79 Among those arrested were ten FARDC 
colonels, mostly ex-Tigers from the south, stationed 
in Katanga but also as far away as Equateur 
province.80 Some of these had fallen out with Numbi 
shortly before.81  
Other prominent Numbi and Kabila foes were intimidated 
but not arrested, including Muyambo, who as head of 
Solidarité Katangaise and Sempya could have much 
greater influence on elections than Tshombe. He was 
summoned by the local prosecutor and warned not to 
leave town. He claimed Numbi personally threatened him 
and FARDC soldiers surrounded his compound.82 
Another wealthy local politician from the south, Katebe 
Katoto, postponed a return to Katanga from abroad to 
launch the campaign of his party, the Union of Liberals 
for Democracy (ULD).83 He claims to have received 
death threats from Numbi. Vincent de Paul Lunda 
Bululu,84 a prime minister under Mobutu and now head of 
 
78 Crisis Group interviews, Lubumbashi, June 2005. Also see 
“Sécesssion du Katanga”, op. cit., p. 9. 
79 In an interview with a local newspaper, Le Fédéral, Tshombe 
said he had been received by the president of the Belgian senate, 
ibid., p. 9. 
80 The following Katangan commanders were arrested in 
Equateur: Colonel Kabinda Yav, Colonel Yav a Yav, Major 
Kadimbili, Major Kamboyi and Captain Nkemba. 
81 This was the case of Captain Itala, commander of the GSSP 
heavy artillery battalion in Lubumbashi, as well as Major 
Jajija, commander of the military police in Lubumbashi. Crisis 
Group interviews with UN officials, Kinshasa, June/July 2005. 
82 Crisis Group interview, Jean-Claude Muyambo, Lubumbashi, 
June 2005. 
83 Katebe Katoto is a rich Bemba businessman from southern 
Katanga who made his fortune in local trade. He became a 
close associate of former President Chiluba of Zambia and is 
accused by current President Mwanawasa of arms trafficking 
and plotting against him. After their investigations indicated 
that he and his brother, Moise Katumbi, were also involved in 
embezzlement of state funds, the Zambian authorities froze 
their assets. Katoto was vice president of RCD-Goma at the 
beginning of the transition but has since founded his own 
party, the ULD.  
84 Lunda Bululu, a southern Katangan, was the prime 
minister of Zaire under Mobutu, 1990-1991, and foreign 
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the Rally of Socialist Federalists (RSF), also reported 
Numbi threats.85 Others, who had publicly urged 
secession on local television and in newspapers such as 
the Notables Katangais led by Mbenga Sandongo,86 were 
not affected by the clamp-down.  
The handling of the incident revealed the parallel 
command structures that still exist in Katanga. General 
Numbi travelled to Katanga to head the investigation, 
presiding over the provincial security council instead of 
the governor.87According to local military sources, he 
gave direct orders to the Lubumbashi security services 
to track down and arrest the suspects, by-passing the 
regional military commander and civilian authorities. 
 
minister 1994-1995. He later joined in turn the RCD-Goma 
and MLC parties before starting his own party in 2004. 
85 Crisis Group interview with local politician, Lubumbashi, 
June 2005. 
86 Me Mbenga appears frequently on local television to 
defend his demand for secession. He has also written to the 
UN. See www.katanga-freedom.com.  
87 Crisis Group interviews, Lubumbashi and Kinshasa, 
June/July 2005. 
III. KEEPING THE PEACE 
Katanga has not seen major fighting since 2001 so the 
international community has mostly lost sight of its 
politics. MONUC established an office in Lubumbashi 
only in January 2003 and has a much smaller presence 
there than in Bukavu, Goma and Bunia. Until recently, 
there were only around 150 UN soldiers in the province, 
assigned to protect UN installations in Kalemie on Lake 
Tanganyika. They do not have the tasking or resources to 
address any of Katanga’s security concerns, and MONUC 
officials rarely travel to the remote northern and central 
areas. Security Council Resolution 1635 (28 October 
2005), which raised MONUC’s troop ceiling, will allow 
deployment of a battalion of 800 soldiers, mostly from 
Benin. While this is welcome, the troops’ tasking is not 
yet clear.  
1. Integration of armed groups and 
demobilisation of combatants 
As in the rest of the Congo, the armed groups in Katanga 
are far from being integrated into a common, coherent 
command structure. At the beginning of the transition in 
2003, three broad armed groups were present: Congolese 
Armed Forces (FAC) loyal to Joseph Kabila; the National 
Congolese Army (ANC) loyal to the RCD-Goma of 
Azarias Ruberwa; and various Mai-Mai groups which, 
while pledging allegiance to Kabila, lacked a single 
command and often fought each other. According to a 
recent estimate, there are around 20,000 ex-FAC and ex-
ANC soldiers and perhaps 5,000 to 8,000 Mai-Mai in 
Katanga.88 In addition, at least 1,000 of the Special Guard 
for Presidential Security (GSSP), Kabila’s presidential 
protection force, are deployed in Lubumbashi and 
Kolwezi, still under his direct command. In recent months, 
these GSSP soldiers have become increasingly aggressive, 
harassing civilians at roadblocks and abusing diplomats 
and MONUC personnel. In late October 2005, they beat 
up a MONUC local staff member and the next month 
stopped a Belgian diplomat and his wife and harassed 
them at gunpoint.  
The integration of armed forces has proceeded slowly in 
Katanga – in the case of many Mai-Mai factions, not at 
all. As in most provinces, two competing integration 
process are under way: one, from the national level as 
 
 
88 Crisis Group interviews with FARDC commanders in 
Lubumbashi and Kinshasa, June and August 2005. The 
census, conducted by the army, was solely of ex-FAC and ex-
ANC soldiers; Mai-Mai figures are from a Crisis Group 
interview with MONUC, see fn. 3 above. The census revealed 
that FARDC troop figures in Katanga had been inflated by 38 
per cent. 
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part of the Global and Inclusive Agreement that started 
the transition, and a second, at the provincial level at the 
discretion of the regional commanders. No nationally 
integrated force has yet been deployed in Katanga but 
the provincial commanders have merged various local 
forces. Ex-ANC soldiers (the RCD armed wing), based 
in the north-eastern towns of Kalemie, Nyunzu, Kabalo 
and Manono, have been slowly integrated into the sixth 
military regional command based in Lubumbashi. The 
May 2004 mutiny of dissident ex-ANC forces in 
Bukavu speeded up the dissolution of the former ANC 
command, as several prominent former commanders 
fled Katanga to South Kivu, including the old brigade 
commander, the police commander of Kalemie and 
members of the security services.89 The ex-FAC naval 
commander, General Madoa Madoa, was subsequently 
sent to Kalemie to take over the forces there.90 The local 
integration process has been unequal, however; few 
Mai-Mai and ex-FAP have been incorporated into the 
eight local brigades. 
Officers from all Congolese armed groups that were 
signatories to the Pretoria Agreement were named to the 
regional command in Lubumbashi in August 2003. An 
ex-MLC commander, General Alengbia Nzambe, was 
placed at the head of the sixth military region with an ex-
FAC deputy. Local military commanders have complained 
however, that the former regional commander was often 
sidelined from decision-making and that commanders 
close to Kabila have continued to give orders through 
their personal military networks. These parallel command 
structures and the lack of transparency in the military 
command have undermined unification of the armed 
groups. Commanders suspect each other and refrain from 
relinquishing control over their men. This situation persists 
under the new military regional commander from the 
MLC, General Widi Mbulu Divioka. 
Nonetheless, the overall security situation in Katanga has 
improved. Territories such as Kitenge, for example, are 
now accessible to humanitarian organisations, and the 
numbers of displaced there have gone down. In other 
areas, such as the triangle between Mitwaba, Manono and 
Pweto, where the army began an offensive against 
 
 
89 Crisis Group interview, international NGO, Lubumbashi, 
June 2005. Many of these officials were Banyamulenge. The 
brigade commander, Colonel Fraterne Kibunga, was arrested 
by the Munyamulenge Colonel Patrick Masunzu in June 2004 
along with three other Banyamulenge officers and handed 
over first to General John Numbi in July 2005 then to a 
military tribunal in Lubumbashi. See “Le RCD réclame la 
libération des officiers ex-ANC transférés à Lubumbashi”, 20 
July 2005, http://www.radiookapi.net/article.php?id=2548.  
90 Madoa Madoa, also known as Lokole, is an ex-Mai-Mai 
commander from South Kivu and close associate of Laurent 
Kabila. 
Commander Gédéon in November 2005, violence has 
increased since the beginning of the transition, while 
tensions in urban areas such as Lubumbashi and Kolwezi 
have been exacerbated by electoral pressures.  
As noted above, CONADER, the national commission 
charged with demobilising and reintegrating soldiers into 
civilian life, started slowly. After its Kamina orientation 
centre opened in August 2005, arriving soldiers were 
often stranded there without food or health care.91 The 
lack of orientation centres in the centre and the north, 
where most Mai-Mai operate, has also meant that many 
militiamen are forced to walk long distances to enter the 
integration process. While CONADER has experienced 
technical difficulties, many Mai-Mai leaders are reluctant 
to enter the integration process as they fear arrest, while 
others feel bolstered by ties to officials such as General 
Numbi and Governor Ngoy. Pastor Mulunda’s parallel 
demobilisation initiatives have further confused matters.  
Mai-Mai demobilisation requires a carrot and stick 
approach. Regroupment centres and transportation 
between them and the integration centres need to be 
improved so as to take care of the militiamen who have 
waited months to join the process. The authorities need 
to investigate thoroughly commanders such as Gédéon 
who have been accused of human rights violations and 
arrest them if evidence is found. 92 Remaining officers 
should be offered positions in the national army as has 
been done with Mai-Mai commanders in the Kivus.  
FARDC should send integrated brigades against 
recalcitrant Mai-Mai, as has been done in Ituri district, 
where despite logistical problems and failure to pay 
salaries regularly, the first and fourth integrated brigades, 
supported by MONUC, have pushed the militias out of 
several towns and constrained their actions. However, no 
integrated brigade has yet been deployed to Katanga. As 
described below, MONUC’s cooperation is essential, not 
only for tactical support but also to make sure FARDC 
does not abuse civilians. The Katangan Mai-Mai are 
poorly organised and would probably surrender quickly to 
a well-advertised demobilisation and integration program.  
CONADER is now functional and should be solely 
responsible for demobilisation and reintegration in the 
province. Pastor Mulunda’s ongoing bikes-for-weapons 
initiative93 should be discouraged because it will only 
further confuse the combatants and lead to complaints 
and violence.  
 
91 See fn. 19 above. 
92 Gédéon’s group is active in Mitwaba and has been 
accused by many locals of atrocities, including cannibalism. 
93 Mulunda visited Kongolo and Malemba Nkulu in June and 
July 2005. 
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2. MONUC’s deployment and mandate 
Although the violence in Katanga is as bad as it has been 
in the Kivus and Ituri during the same period, MONUC 
has deployed fewer than 1,000 of its 17,000 troops 
to Katanga.94 The Committee for the Support of the 
Transition (CIAT), the Kinshasa-based body that 
coordinates the actions of important foreign actors in the 
Congo, rarely raises problems pertaining to Katanga.  
The UN Secretary-General’s Third Special Report on the 
Congo (16 August 2004) recommended establishment 
of a 3,500-strong brigade for Katanga and Kasai, 
headquartered in Kamina and with battalions deployed to 
Kalemie, Lubumbashi and Mbuji Mayi, as well as a 
reserve battalion in Kamina. Security Council Resolution 
1565 (1 October 2004), however, failed to raise the troop 
ceiling high enough to create this brigade. The Secretary-
General reiterated his plea for more troops in a special 
report on the elections in March 2005 asking for the 
ceiling to be raised to 19,290, including a 2,590-strong 
brigade for Katanga and Kasai. Given the reluctance of 
some Security Council members, especially the U.S., to 
increase the mission budget, the proposal has fared 
poorly.95 When MONUC’s mandate was renewed for a 
year in November 2005, the Council authorised only an 
additional 300 troops, far short of needs.  
According to the UN Department of Peacekeeping 
Operations (DPKO), these troops will be used to enable 
deployment of a battalion of around 800 to Katanga, 
with bases in Kamina, Lubumbashi and Kalemie.96 Even 
this deployment is meeting with administrative and 
logistical delays, and it will need to be matched with a 
stronger and clearer concept of operations for the 
province, so that operations like those in Ituri can be 
conducted, including aggressive patrolling, cordon and 
search, and establishment of demilitarised zones. In late 
December 2005, 125 Indian police arrived to carry out 
patrols but they are too few to operate beyond 
Lubumbashi and its immediate vicinity.  
MONUC’s deployment has caused consternation among 
local military officials, who want to avoid interference 
with their activities, particularly at Lubumbashi airport. 
 
 
94 By the end of 2005, MONUC had around 150 peacekeepers 
in Kalemie with the mandate to protect UN installations; part of 
the battalion of 800 additional troops had arrived in Lubumbashi 
and Kamina but still lacked clear tasking. 
95 Crisis Group interviews with diplomats, New York, June 
2005. 
96 Crisis Group interview with UN official, Kinshasa, 
November 2005. While only 300 additional soldiers were 
authorised, MONUC was several hundred below its ceiling 
at the time, so it should be able to bring in approximately 
800 new troops. 
On 28 October 2005, a local MONUC staff member, who 
was helping the new MONUC troops there, was beaten 
by Special Guard for Presidential Security (GSSP) 
soldiers. Local authorities complain the UN’s Radio 
Okapi in Lubumbashi harms President Kabila’s 
reputation, and the GSSP has intimidated its staff.97 
3. Good governance and abuse of power 
A failed state that allows individuals to use public office 
for personal power and enrichment is partly the root 
of political ills in Katanga as in all the Congo. Tax 
exemptions, fraudulent allocation of mining concessions 
and the parallel command structures in the administration 
and army are all examples.  
Mismanagement contributes directly to violence. The 
poor and irregular payment of soldiers, for example, has 
made the national army, FARDC, arguably the single 
largest security threat for Congolese civilians. Foreign 
experts estimate that of the $8 million allocated each 
month for salaries and rations, between $3.5 million and 
$5.8 million goes missing. Much of the embezzlement 
happens through payment of “ghost soldiers”, but even 
the real soldiers are often not paid and rarely receive 
their rations.98 The combination of poorly paid soldiers 
and commanders still beholden to the old chains of 
command makes for a dangerous situation on the eve of 
elections whose fairness is already being compromised 
by the machinations of political elites in Lubumbashi 
and Kinshasa, and whose results could well be protested 
violently.  
The Congolese institutions meant to produce good 
governance have been emasculated and are largely 
neglected by the international community. Judicial reform 
lags due to a lack of funding but also of political will. 
Most higher court judges in Kinshasa – including those 
on the Supreme Court and the High Council of Judges – 
were appointed by Joseph Kabila before the transition 
began. Laws on the High Council and the status of judges 
have been blocked for over a year, so judges are still 
controlled by the justice ministry. This politicisation of 
the judiciary has made any action in cases involving 
important officials and commanders difficult. No thorough 
Congolese investigation has been made of the Kilwa 
incident or the arrests following the alleged secession 
 
97 Crisis Group interview with UN official, Kinshasa, November 
2005. 
98 Crisis Group interview with diplomats and officials, 
Kinshasa, November 2005. The army has continued paying 
the 352,000 soldiers of a 2004 estimate even though its own 
census has placed actual strength at 244,000 and a not yet 
completed South African census estimates troop strength at 
between 150,000 and 160,000.  
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attempt. While the JUNAFEC officials were suspended 
from their party after their recent incendiary statements, 
they have not been indicted for hate speech.  
The weakness of the courts has undermined laudable 
initiatives by the parliament and the revenue court (Cour 
des Comptes). For example, after a parliamentary 
commission led by Gregoire Bakandeja suspended six 
ministers and several dozen officials of state-run 
enterprises for corruption in January 2005 and referred 
the cases to the public prosecutor, no indictments have 
been issued.99 
Similar impunity has allowed officials to continue to use 
their offices to get access to mining sector profits. A 
parliamentary commission led by Christophe Lutundula 
and supported by the World Bank has produced a report 
on contracts signed during the war, which is specially 
relevant to Katanga, as it examines whether the contracts 
are legal and benefit national development. The 
commission’s mandate should be extended, however, 
since it only covers contracts signed up to June 2003, 
and some companies are already said to be guarding 
themselves against the report’s recommendations by 
signing new deals. Moreover, the report, which was 
submitted to parliament in July 2005, has not been made 
public. Some politicians have tried to suppress it, and 
Lutundula has received death threats.100 Without outside 
pressure, it is not likely even to be discussed.  
Meanwhile, outside pressure is faltering. The UN 
Secretary-General has pushed for the Security Council to 
address good governance as an election prerequisite and 
has proposed that donors create a “group of friends of 
good governance” to meet regularly in Kinshasa to 
examine corruption allegations and coordinate pressure 
on the government.101 At a meeting with key diplomats 
and his vice presidents in late October 2005, President 
Kabila turned down the donors group proposal. Many 
members of CIAT accept corruption as a necessary evil to 
be addressed only after the new government is elected.102 
Upon recommendations from Kinshasa embassies, the 
Security Council later watered down MONUC’s mandate 
renewal, dropping the donors group and limiting the 
mission’s ability to promote good governance.  
Donors need to review their policy of “Congolese 
ownership” and tie aid tighter to reform. They have done 
 
 
99 Crisis Group interview with Vice President Azarias Ruberwa, 
Kinshasa, June 2005. 
100 Crisis Group interview with diplomat, Kinshasa, November 
2005. 
101 “Secretary-General’s Special Report on Elections”, 
S/2005/320, 26 May 2005. 
102 Crisis Group interviews with diplomats, New York, 
Brussels, Paris and Kinshasa. 
little to ensure that the more than 50 per cent of the 
budget they contribute is not squandered and embezzled, 
unlike, for example, in Liberia where aid is to be 
conditioned on acceptance of a program involving tight 
supervision of revenues.103 A diplomat in Kinshasa 
expresses the priority: “Corruption is an issue that has 
existed in the Congo for decades and will not be fixed in a 
few months. We must get elections done, have a more 
legitimate government and then address good governance 
and impunity”.104  
This reasoning is flawed. Current levels of corruption and 
abuse of power are themselves sources of instability that 
threaten the transition and could compromise elections. 
Without capable legal institutions to apply electoral laws, 
intimidation and corruption will undermine the results, 
and if embezzlement is not tackled head on now, the 
Congolese state will likely never be able to put together a 
viable budget, let alone spend it effectively. Donors are 
not helpless: they can, for instance, apply pressure on 
their own domestic companies that operate in the Congo 
to respect its laws and international norms and satisfy 
minimum standards of transparency and accountability.105  
Moreover, if it had the political will, the international 
community would be in a stronger position to address 
good governance now: signatories to the peace accords 
agreed that CIAT would be a formal transition institution 
with the mandate to counsel the government. Donors will 
be in a weaker position after the elections, when they 
have indicated they wish to see MONUC’s budget 
reduced and its staffing scaled down.106  
 
103 The Governance Economic Management Assistance 
Program (GEMAP). 
104 Crisis Group interview with diplomat, Kinshasa, October 
2005. 
105 In Belgium, for example, the intervention and protection of 
the Ducroire Office, the national agency that insures companies 
against political and commercial risks in developing countries, 
should be conditioned upon their respect of good governance in 
the Congo. 
106 Crisis Group interview with diplomats, Kinshasa, October 
and November 2005. 
Katanga: The Congo’s Forgotten Crisis 





Katanga could be one of the Congo’s most violent regions 
during the electoral season. President Kabila faces a 
stiff challenge there from parties such as Union for 
Democracy and Social Progress (UDPS) and 
organisations like Solidarité Katangaise, and almost no 
progress has been made in demobilising Mai-Mai in the 
north and centre of the province. The deployment of 
integrated army units with MONUC military and police 
support to urban areas and the north could help with 
election security and demobilisation, although troop levels 
are too low to deal with all threats. As elsewhere in the 
country, however, Katanga’s problems have been caused 
by the weakness and corruption of state institutions. The 
international community has focused on managing crises in 
the east on a case by case basis. Its much lesser emphasis 
on accountability and rule of law has allowed the elites in 
power to manipulate the state apparatus, including the 
army, with results such as the Kilwa incident, manipulation 
of the alleged secession attempt and UNAFEC’s bullying.  
This abuse of power can only be addressed by 
strengthening the independence and the capacity of 
democratic institutions such as courts, the parliament 
and the press. Donors should establish mechanisms for 
linking their significant support to good governance, 
especially in the mining sector. International companies 
should implement, perhaps with the help of the 
International Labour Organization (ILO), a code of good 
conduct with regard to living standards and working 
conditions for miners, and work with Congolese 
civil society to establish a trust fund supporting fair 
payment, relocation, land rights, medical care and 
training for artisanal miners. Innovations elsewhere 
such as the Kimberly process for diamonds, the 
GEMAP in Liberia, and the initiatives to deal with the 
revenues from the Chad-Cameroon pipeline should 
inspire management of the Congo’s vast natural 
resources but there is very little discussion or debate 
about such possibilities.  
Two months before elections, the Congo is far from 
attaining the goals set by those who signed the Global 
and Inclusive Agreement in 2002. Army integration is 
advancing sluggishly – by late 2005 affecting only 18,000 
of the roughly 160,000 troops in the country. Large parts 
of the local administration, the security services and the 
courts have not even begun to be integrated, and many 
pre-transition officials remain in power. Most importantly, 
the extensive corruption and pervasive abuse of power 
raise serious questions about whether the elections can 
produce a stable and legitimate government.  
In many ways, Katanga is symptomatic of those systemic 
national problems. Making a start of attacking those 
problems there now is vital since its mining revenues 
have traditionally accounted for 50 per cent to 80 per cent 
of the national budget. The international community and 
Congolese authorities should adopt a more comprehensive 
vision of the peace process in the key province in order to 
prevent renewed fighting after elections and allow real 
development and democratic accountability to take root. 
Nairobi/Brussels, 9 January 2006 
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ANC National Congolese Army, former army of Rwandan-backed RCD rebels 
CIAT International Committee for the Accompaniment of the Transition, group of major international 
actors in the Congo, a formal institution of the transitional government based in Kinshasa 
CNS National Sovereign Conference, convened in 1991-1992 by Mobutu to usher in transition to democracy 
CONAKAT National Confederation of Katanga, Moise Tshombe’s secessionist political party of the 1960s 
CONACO National Congolese Confederation, contemporary political party led by André Tshombe 
CONADER National Demobilisation and Reintegration Commission, government institution responsible for 
demobilisation  
DPKO Department of Peacekeeping Operations, UN Secretareiat department that manages peacekeeping 
missions 
EUSEC European Union Security Advisory Commission, EU technical team providing advice on army reform  
FAC Congolese Armed Forces, former army of Laurent Kabila and later of his son, Joseph Kabila 
FAP Armed Popular Forces, local Mai-Mai militia in northern Katanga 
FARDC Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, integrated army composed of former 
belligerents now participating in the transitional government 
Gécamines State-owned mining company in Katanga 
GEMAP Governance and Economic Management Assistance Program, initiative for international cooperation 
and financial oversight in Liberia 
Gendarmes Katangais armed forces of Moise Tshombe’s secessionist state  
Global and Inclusive Agreement peace deal signed between the Congolese belligerents in Pretoria in December 2002 
GSSP Special Group for Presidential Security, Joseph Kabila’s presidential guard 
ILO International Labour Organisation 
JEBAKAT Balubakat Youth of Katanga, youth militia for the secessionist state of northern Katanga, 1960-1961 
JUFERI Youth wing of UFERI, youth militia that carried out ethnic cleansing in 1990s 
JUNAFEC Youth wing of UNAFEC, youth militia of prominent political party in Katanga 
Katangan Tigers descendents of the gendarmes Katangais, who supported the secession of Katanga in 1960 and later 
fled to Angola  
Luba ethnic community from Kasai province, many of whom emigrated to urban areas in Katanga  
Lubakat ethnic community in northern Katanga to which Laurent and Joseph Kabila belong 
Mai-Mai local defence force, about 5,000 to 8,000-strong in northern Katanga, that often recruits along tribal 
lines and harbors traditional beliefs 
MIGA Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency, World Bank body that provides risk insurance 
MLC Movement for the Liberation of the Congo, former rebel movement led by Jean-Pierre Bemba 
MONUC United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, first established in 1999, now 
includes 17,000 UN troops 
MRC Congolese Revolutionary Movement, militia in Ituri district 
MRLK Revolutionary Movement for the Liberation of Katanga, small rebel group that captured Kilwa in 
October 2004 
OFIDA National Customs Office 
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PAREC Church Program for Peace and Conflict Transformation and Reconciliation, ecclesiastical group that 
has set up its own demobilisation program in Katanga 
PPRD Party of the People for Reconstruction and Development, Joseph Kabila’s poltical party 
Radio Okapi UN radio station in the Congo 
RCD Rally for Congolese Democracy, former rebel movement led by Azarias Ruberwa 
RSF Rally of Socialist Federalists, Katangan political party led by Lunda Bululu 
RTIV Radio Télévision Inter Viens et Voies, local television station in Lubumbashi 
RTNC Congolese National Radio and Television, a state-run institution 
Solidarité Katangaise NGO led by southerners involved in civic education in Katanga that may rally opposition to 
Kabila during elections  
SNCC National Society of Railroads, state-owned railroad company 
SOMIKA Katanga Mineral Company, private company dealing in cassiterite and heterogenite 
UDPS Union for Democracy and Social Progress, major opposition party led by Etienne Tshisekedi 
UFERI Union of Federalists and Independent Republicans, political party that instigated ethnic cleansing in 
Katanga in the 1990s 
ULD Union of Liberals for Democracy, Katangan political party led by Katebe Katoto 
UNADEF National Union of Congolese Federalists, Katangan political party led by Christian Mwando 
UNAFEC Union of Congolese Nationalists and Federalists, Katangan political party led by Honorius Kisimba 
Ngoy
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